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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH  
 
 
HEATHER LEYVA, an individual, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
BLAINE ROBBINS, a Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
 
Case No. 2:18-cv-00121-RJS-CMR 
 
Chief Judge Robert J. Shelby 
 
Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero 
 
 
 This civil rights suit arises out of interactions between Plaintiff Heather Leyva and 
Defendant Blaine Robbins.  At the time of those interactions, Robbins worked as the Utah Highway 
Patrol’s Heavy Duty Towing Rotation Coordinator, and Leyva worked as the receptionist and 
Heavy Duty Towing Rotation liaison for a towing company.  Specifically, Leyva claims Robbins 
violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures and her Fourteenth 
Amendment right to be free from sexual harassment by a state actor. 
Before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  Leyva moves for 
summary judgment on her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims,1 and Robbins moves for 
summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity.2  Because qualified immunity 
potentially provides Robbins with immunity from suit, the court begins by evaluating Robbins’s 
Motion.  As explained below, the court concludes Robbins is entitled to qualified immunity.  For 
that reason, Robbins’s Motion is GRANTED and Leyva’s Motion is DENIED. 
 
1 Dkt. 40. 
2 Dkt. 43. 
Case 2:18-cv-00121-RJS   Document 72   Filed 04/06/20   Page 1 of 39
2 
 
BACKGROUND3 
 
 In November 2016, West Coast Towing (WCT) entered into a Towing Rotation Agreement 
with the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP).4  Under the terms of the Agreement, UHP would assign 
lucrative towing jobs to three companies on UHP’s Heavy Duty Towing Rotation (HDTR) and 
each company would tow crippled vehicles from highways in northern Utah.5  Robbins, a UHP 
Sergeant at the time, served as the “Coordinator” for the Agreement from October 2016 to June 
2017.6  As the HDTR Coordinator, Robbins communicated frequently with Leyva at WCT and 
oversaw the performance of the Agreement.7  Among other things, the Agreement gave Robbins 
authority to suspend WCT from the HDTR if WCT or one of its employees violated the terms of 
the Agreement.8 
 In January 2017, Leyva became a full-time receptionist at WCT, where she also served as 
WCT’s liaison to the UHP.9  As WCT’s liaison, Leyva worked with Robbins to ensure WCT 
fulfilled its responsibilities under the Agreement.10  As part of her duties, Leyva raised with 
 
3 After carefully reviewing the parties’ pleadings and cross-motions for summary judgment, the court has determined 
the facts cited here are undisputed.  This includes facts asserted by one party but undisputed by the other.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must . . . admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by 
an opposing party”); Id. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the 
assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically 
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”).  Where applicable, the court cites to parts of the record 
showing certain facts are undisputed. 
4 Dkt. 43 at 3 ¶ 1, dkt. 53 at 6. 
5 Dkt. 40 at 6–7 ¶ 4, dkt. 40-1 at 32–39. 
6 Dkt. 20 at 4 ¶ 12, dkt. 36 at 4 ¶ 12, dkt. 43 at 4 ¶ 6, dkt. 53 at 6. 
7 Dkt. 20 at 3 ¶ 10, dkt. 36 at 3–4 ¶ 10, dkt. 40 at 6 ¶ 4, dkt. 44 at 2 ¶ 4. 
8 Dkt. 40-1 at 37–38. 
9 Dkt. 20 at 3 ¶ 10, dkt. 36 at 3–4 ¶ 10, dkt. 43 at 3 ¶ 2, dkt. 53 at 6. 
10 Dkt. 20 at 3 ¶ 10, dkt. 36 at 3–4 ¶ 10, dkt. 40 at 6 ¶ 4, dkt. 44 at 2 ¶ 4. 
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Robbins WCT’s concern that UHP disproportionately assigned HDTR towing jobs to WCT’s 
competitors.11  She also appears to have attended some HDTR-related tow jobs.12 
Leyva and Robbins’s Relationship 
 Leyva first met Robbins on December 18, 2016, when WCT responded to a HDTR job on 
Utah’s Highway 6 in Spanish Fork Canyon.13  A few months later, on March 18, 2017, Leyva went 
on a UHP ride-along with Robbins.14  He took Leyva on a tour to his grandparents’ house, his 
favorite fishing holes in Santaquin Canyon, and to dinner at a Wendy’s in Provo.15  He also made 
traffic stops, helped with a car fire, and assisted a vehicle that had “gone off  the road in Provo 
Canyon.”16  On March 25, 2017, Leyva texted Robbins, “I’m ready for my next ride along lol.”17  
After the ride-along, Leyva and Robbins began communicating frequently via text messages and 
telephone calls.18  Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims center around events 
occurring between March 25, 2017, and June 15, 2017. 
During that period, Leyva and Robbins texted each other often.  Sometimes their exchanges 
were work related; other times they were not.19  It is difficult to adequately summarize the parties’ 
 
11 Dkt. 40 at 7 ¶ 5, dkt. 44 at 3 ¶ 5. 
12 Dkt. 43 at 5 ¶¶ 12–13, dkt. 53 at 12 ¶ 12, dkt. 43-2 at 44. 
13 Dkt. 43 at 5 ¶¶ 12–13, dkt. 53 at 12 ¶ 12. 
14 Dkt. 43 at 6 ¶ 17, dkt. 53 at 12–13. 
15 Dkt. 43 at 6 ¶ 18, dkt. 53 at 12–13. 
16 Dkt. 43 at 6 ¶ 18, dkt. 53 at 12–13. 
17 Dkt. 43 at 7 ¶ 20, dkt. 53 at 13 ¶ 20, dkt. 43-2 at 149. 
18 Dkt. 20 at 4 ¶ 14, dkt. 36 at 4 ¶ 14, dkt. 43 at 7 ¶¶ 24–26, dkt. 53 at 14 ¶ 27.  The parties submitted nearly 150 pages 
of text communications between March 25, 2017, and June 15, 2017.  The text exchanges are clearly incomplete as 
many messages are obviously missing, including some in the middle of certain exchanges.  Many of the messages 
lack dates and times, making it unclear when some of the messages were exchanged.  Because Robbins deleted the 
messages from his phone, the messages presented to the court came from Leyva’s device.  See dkt. 43-2.  Though they 
disagree on what the messages imply, the parties do not dispute the content or authenticity of the text messages.  Dkt. 
40 at 7–8, dkt. 44 at 3–6, dkt. 43 at 7–14, dkt. 53 at 14–35.  Nor does either party advance any evidentiary objections 
concerning the text messages.  Accordingly, the court considers the text messages in its analysis. 
19 See generally dkt. 43-2. 
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countless text message exchanges over the course of three months.  The exchanges are sometimes 
initiated by Robbins and sometimes initiated by Leyva.  At different times, both suggested to the 
other that they get together for lunch or exercise.  The parties often texted about fitness-related 
issues, including food, diet, exercise, and a mutual weight-loss challenge they undertook.20  They 
frequently texted about lunch or dinner plans, and Robbins sometimes invited Leyva out for 
drinks.21  Although it is unclear how often the parties followed through on their lunch or dinner 
plans, it is clear they followed through at least occasionally. 22  During these meals, they addressed 
business-related issues.23 
 Later in the relevant period, Robbins texted Leyva about her physical appearance and her 
attractiveness.24  For instance, on May 31, 2017, the following exchange occurred: 
Robbins: “Did ya hear that?” 
Leyva: “Nope I stepped away from my phone. Whatcha got!?” 
Robbins: “I said, Salt lake could you get a hold of west coast towing and tell their 
Secretary she’s pretty darn sexy and doesn’t need to loose any weight….. (winking 
emoji)” 
Leyva: “What!?! You did not!!!!” 
Robbins: “Hehe, just seeing if you were paying attention” 
Leyva: “You wouldn’t do that!!!” 
Robbins: “Haha maybe not however……….. I am the Sgt, and I’m always 
right!!!!!” 
(missing text) 
Robbins: “yep….for sure, just ask me…” 
Leyva: “Ask you what you know, or if you are always right?!?” 
Robbins: “Whichever…. I KNOW I’m always RIGHT. Especially when it come to 
that….” 
Robbins: “Hehehe” 
Robbins: “Trust me on this one.” 
Leyva: “Lol. Well I appreciate that but, I know it needs to happen!” 
 
20 Dkt. 43-2 at 12–16, 28–33, 35–41, 44, 48– 50, 54–56, 60–61, 64–65, 68, 71, 79–80, 83, 85–87, 89–94, 100–01, 103, 
107, 110–11, 120–21, 123–26, 129, 132–33, 136–37, 141–47. 
21 Dkt. 43-2 at 16, 22, 38, 76, 107.  It is not clear from the record whether the parties ever got drinks together. 
22 Dkt. 53 at 17, dkt. 43-3 at 111:23–112:24, dkt. 64 at 5–6. 
23 Dkt. 53 at 17, dkt. 43-3 at 111:23–112:24, dkt. 64 at 5–6. 
24 Dkt. 43-2 at 34, 51, 109–10, 112–13. 
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Robbins: “If it makes you feel better about you, then do it.”  
Robbins: “Trust me I know how guys think. (weird I know) and you are a 10.” 
Leyva: “(blushing emoji) thank u”25 
 
On at least four occasions, Robbins invited himself over to Leyva’s home,26 but never went 
to her home.27  He also referred to Leyva as “sweet pea,” “skinny lady,” “my lady,” “hot blond 
chick,” and “babe.”28  Some of Robbins’s text messages included sexual overtures and 
innuendos,29 and Leyva also initiated or reciprocated messages with sexual overtures and 
innuendos.30  For example, the following exchange occurred on March 31, 2017: 
Robbins: “(Now don’t get mad at me). I decided to take tonight off because we have 
plenty of man power, so hopefully I can get a run in…. I need to stay on top of it. 
I’m up to 5 miles and I don’t want to lose it.” 
Leyva: “Lol oh how would it be!?!?” 
Robbins: “Hahaha, sorry. My much much better half begged me” 
Leyva: “Lol well in that case I forgive u! Hopefully you get something good out of 
it (winking emoji with tongue out)” 
Robbins: “MY THOUGHTS EXACTLY!!!!! Hahaha. However I’ve learned not to 
get my hopes up…” 
Leyva: “Hahhahaha they say it’s a great way to burn calories lol” 
Leyva: “(I mean… ‘I heard’) (zipped mouth emoji, pensive emoji)” 
Robbins: “Hey!!!! That could be something we could work together on!!!!!(sly 
emoji)” 
Robbins: “Running I meant…..” 
Leyva: “LMAO” 
Robbins: “What you don’t like to run?” 
Leyva: “Run (running emoji) Lol ya I like to run” 
Robbins: “What were you thinking? (sly emoji)” 
Leyva: “Hahahahah” 
Leyva: “Probably shouldn’t elaborate on that (laughing with tears emoji) 
Robbins: “And Trust me…..I’m not a LAM” 
Leyva: “LAM? Help me out I’m an old lady idk what that is” 
 
25 Dkt. 43-2 at 112–13 (errors in original). 
26 Dkt. 43-2 at 29, 90, 104, 145. 
27 Dkt. 43 at 7 ¶ 23, dkt. 43-3 at 43 ¶¶ 23–25, dkt. 53 at 14–15. 
28 Dkt. 43-2 at 18, 25, 38, 50, 69, 79, 86, 111, 128. 
29 Dkt. 43-2 at 19, 22, 28–31, 34, 36, 51, 53–54, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 109–10, 112–13, 118–19, 122–24, 128.  
30 Dkt. 43-2 at 54, 120, 122–24. 
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(missing texts) 
Robbins: “OH….haha haha…. Maybe idiot works better for me…” 
Leyva: “Lol” 
Robbins: “Well… You wouldn’t do that either It would be the BEST thing that has 
ever happened to you…… (open mouth emoji)” 
Leyva: “Wait!!!!! What are we talking about again!?!? The laughing or the 
running!?” 
Leyva: “Or whatever else we weren’t talking about lol” 
Robbins: “Haha haha use your imagination.. J/k” 
Robbins: “I’m just being stupid. Erase and start over….” 
Robbins: “It’s fun to day dream…”31 
And the following exchange appears to have occurred on May 1, 2017: 
Leyva: “I haven’t had fast food that wasn’t salad since 2 weeks before my ride 
along” 
 Leyva: “You can do it” 
Leyva: “I hung up a bikini in my closet that I have to look at everyday…. I will get 
into it this summer” 
Robbins: “That’s a great idea, I’ll do the same thing.  Loan me one of your bikinis 
to hang up…..hehe” 
 Leyva: “Ok, I’m sure you wife will love that!” 
Robbins: “Hahaha, ya maybe not….. Again the mind thing, I will invision you in 
it. SERIOUS MOTIVATION!!!!”32 
 
On three occasions, Robbins asked Leyva to send him pictures of herself. 33  Although 
Leyva sent pictures in response to Robbins’s first two requests, she did not send a picture in 
response to Robbins’s request for her “sexiest picture.”34  Instead, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Leyva: “So what’s up? U still grumpy pants?!?” 
Leyva: “lol I’ll take that as a yes!! Hahah” 
Robbins: “And yes I am….. Because….I didn’t get to see you long enough…” 
Leyva: “Well… how can we remedy that??” 
Robbins: “I could think of many different ways and positions. Unfortunately we 
can’t tonight. I’m done here at 10 then its off to bed. I have PT test in the morning 
at 7 grrrrrr.”  
 
31 Dkt. 43-2 at 122–25 (errors in original). 
32 Dkt. 43-2 at 54–55 (errors in original). 
33 Dkt. 43-2 at 30, 53–54, 99–100. 
34 See Dkt. 43-2 at 30, 53–54, 99–100. 
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Leyva: “Lol. Ok maybe tomorrow. Good luck with the testing!” 
Robbins: “I guess you could always send me a you best sexiest picture. That might 
help…..” 
Robbins: “(sly emoji)” 
Robbins “Ya know…..only if ya wanted.”  
Leyva: “lol I don’t have any of those!!” 
Leyva: “If u want to meet up on your lunch (dinner) tomorrow… let me know!” 
Robbins: “Ok, your place?????????!!!!!!!” 
Robbins: “OH, THAT’S A GREAT IDEA!!!” 
Robbins: “OK, ILL BE THERE.” 
Leyva: “Lol! Nothing special at my place!” 
Robbins: “UMMM you’re there, right? What more special than that? Nothing I 
say…” 
Leyva: “Not that special lol” 
Robbins: “You’re very special to me.”  
Robbins: “Just saying” 
Robbins: “Always remember that” 
Leyva: “Ok” 
Robbins: “Did we just have a moment?” 
Robbins: “Hehehe” 
Leyva: “lol I think u did hahahah” 
Robbins: “Ya, you’re probably right…. (winking emoji)” 
Leyva: “So tomorrow when u are on, let me know…. I’ll meet ya.  What time do u 
usually do dinner?”35 
 
Many of the messages Robbins sent Leyva were unwanted and upsetting to her.36  Despite 
this, Leyva asserts she “politely attempted to deflect” or “humor” Robbins to avoid upsetting him 
because she believed Robbins “controlled [WCT’s] access to lucrative heavy duty towing jobs.”37  
Leyva frequently texted Robbins for help addressing issues with the towing rotation, and Robbins 
occasionally obliged.38  The two discussed such issues on May 26, 2017, and May 31, 2017: 
Leyva: “What else will u need to get WC towing & transport added? Lmk. Stay 
safe, I’m sure it will be a busy weekend!!” 
Leyva: “I’m getting pressure from both sides (woods & Rob) I was pulled in the 
office this morning because they are talking about putting Dan back on the rotation 
 
35 Dkt. 43-2 at 28–31 (errors in original). 
36 Dkt. 40 at 7 ¶ 9, 8 ¶ 14; dkt. 44 at 4. 
37 Dkt. 40 at 7–8 ¶ 9, dkt. 40-1 at 5, dkt. 44 at 4–5. 
38 Dkt. 43-2 at 19–21, 42, 46–47, 55–56, 62–63, 87–89, 91–92, 94–96, 100–02, 117. 
Case 2:18-cv-00121-RJS   Document 72   Filed 04/06/20   Page 7 of 39
8 
 
stuff because I am not making things happen with hywy & their new WC company. 
Did you not get the packet I turned on?? I’m sweatin here…. a little help???” 
Robbins: “I’ll have you on rotation today” 
Leyva: “(thumbs up emoji)” 
Robbins: “I don’t have the packet with me at the moment. What’s the contact phone 
#?” 
Robbins: “And it area 1 and 2 only correct?” 
Leyva: “(picture of letter) Area 1” 
Leyva: “(picture of letter) Area 2” 
Robbins: “Ok, so you can stop stressing out. I just called dispatch and you’re now 
on the rotation.” 
Leyva: “Thank you”39 
 
Robbins’s responses only related to him putting a “new WC company” on the light duty rotation.40 
Two weeks later, on June 15, 2017, Leyva texted Robbins to express concern that “the 
rotation [was] NOT working the way it should.”41  Robbins called Leyva later that day to discuss 
her concerns and told her to “not give [him] a reason not to like [her].”42  Although the record is 
not clear on this point, it appears this call was the last time the parties’ communicated.43 
The Traffic Stop 
Early in their interactions, Robbins used his UHP vehicle to pull Leyva over.44  On Sunday, 
April 2, 2017, around 5:00 PM, Robbins initiated the following text conversation with Leyva: 
Robbins: “What a great start to my day!!! (sly emoji)” 
Leyva: “LOL. Me and my gigantic yellow jacket!?!” 
Robbins: “Heck yes, even better…haha” 
Leyva: “Lol! Well find two other heavys for the other two on rotation and get me 
another one by midnight and I (unreadable) Do you know if this guy has insurance 
because he heard it was revoked over the radio” 
Robbins: “That, or I’ll just make a house call” 
 
39 Dkt. 43-2 at 19–22 (errors in original). 
40 Dkt. 43 at 13–14, dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 4 ¶ 10, dkt. 53 at 33. 
41 Dkt. 43-2 at 5–6. 
42 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 20, 40-1 at 6 ¶ 19, and 44 at 6–7. 
43 Dkt. 43 at ¶26, dkt. 53 at 14.  
44 Dkt. 20 at 5 ¶ 23, dkt. 36 at 5 ¶ 23, dkt. 40 at 9 ¶¶ 17–18, dkt. 44 at 6 ¶ 18, dkt. 43 at 14–15, dkt. 43-5 (Robbins 
Decl.) at 7–8, dkt. 53 at 37–40. 
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Robbins: “Let me find put” 
Robins: “Out” 
Leyva: “Lol sounds good” 
Robbins: “I just talk to Josh, he said it all showed valid..” 
Leyva: “Perfect. Thanks :)” 
Robbins: “Could you forward me that picture” 
Leyva: “Standby I’m on the freeway” 
Robbins: “No problem” 
Robbins: “Where? I’ll come pull you over.” 
Leyva: “286” 
Robbins: “286? Where ya headed?” 
Leyva: “Bluffdale I’ll be back in 20 minutes” 
Robbins: “I’ll be waiting 285. You in the what car.” 
Robbins: “White car”45 
The number Leyva texted Robbins was the mile marker number on the freeway.46  Although Leyva 
was not driving her personal vehicle,47 Robbins found her, turned on his UHP vehicle’s emergency 
lights without activating the siren, and pulled her over.48  The traffic stop occurred “on 2100 North 
in Lehi” and not on the freeway.49  According to Robbins, the purpose of the traffic stop was “a 
joke between friends.”50  Although Leyva was driving a WCT vehicle with a cracked windshield,51  
Robbins admits he did not notice the cracked windshield until after he initiated the stop and that 
he did not stop Leyva to investigate the windshield.52 
After noticing the UHP vehicle and its emergency lights, Leyva pulled over.53  Leyva did 
not know Robbins was in the UHP vehicle until “he approached the window of the passenger side 
 
45 Dkt. 43-2 at 104–06 (errors in original). 
46 Dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 51 ¶¶ 11–12. 
47 Dkt. 43 at 15 ¶ 61, dkt. 53 at 37–38. 
48 Dkt. 20 at 5 ¶ 23, dkt. 36 at 5 ¶ 23, dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 17, dkt. 40-1 at 5–6, dkt. 43 at 14 ¶ 60, dkt. 53 at 37–38. 
49 Dkt. 53 at 37–38, dkt. 64 at 6, dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 51:12–13.  The record provides no clear explanation for 
how Robbins located Leyva off of the freeway to initiate the traffic stop.  See dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 7 ¶¶ 27–
31. 
50 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 8 ¶ 33. 
51 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 7–8; dkt. 43-9 at 2. 
52 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 7–8. 
53 Dkt. 43 at 15 ¶ 63; dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54:2–12, dkt. 53 at 37–38. 
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of [her] vehicle,”54 but she did take a picture of the UHP vehicle once she stopped.55  Leyva’s 
picture shows the traffic stop occurred around 6:55 PM.56 
After approaching Leyva’s vehicle, Robbins declined her offer of identification57 and told 
her, “I don’t need to see that, just seeing you is enough.”58  Robbins did not cite Leyva for the 
cracked windshield.59  Instead, the parties spoke for nearly ten minutes before going their separate 
ways.60 
At 9:04 PM that night, Robbins initiated the following exchange: 
Robbins: “Just heard there was a disturbance call at your house. What’s the address 
and I’ll come check it out….. (smiling emoji with tongue out)” 
Leyva: “Haha. No disturbance. I am beat, going to bed early. Be safe out there we 
will talk soon.” 
Robbins: “Ah dang!! Ok, sleep well.”61 
 
The next morning, Robbins texted Leyva a picture of a scale, indicating his weight.62  Six 
hours later, Leyva responded, “Good job (hand clap emoji).”63  Robbins replied, “There you are. I 
thought you were a little sore at me for pulling you over yesterday.”64  Concluding the exchange, 
Leyva answered, “Nah.”65 
 
54 Dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54–55. 
55 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins. Decl.) at 8 ¶ 34, dkt. 43-9 at 2. 
56 Dkt. 43-9 at 2. 
57 Dkt. 43 at 15 ¶¶ 63, 65; dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54:16–23; dkt. 53 at 37–38.   
58 Dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54:20–21. 
59 Dkt. 43 at 15 ¶ 65, dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) 55:5–6, dkt. 53 at 38–39. 
60 Dkt. 43 at 15 ¶¶ 63–64, dkt. 53 at 37–38. 
61 Dkt. 43-2 at 104. 
62 Dkt. 43-2 at 103. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
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The Internal Investigation into Robbins’s Conduct66 
Approximately one month after the traffic stop, in May 2017, Leyva reported to her boss 
that Robbins was sexually harassing her.67  Leyva’s complaint was reported to the UHP,68 and an 
internal investigation began in June 2017.69  The internal investigation reviewed Robbins’s text 
communications with Leyva, the traffic stop on April 2, 2017, and Robbins’s actions as the HDTR 
Coordinator.70  In part, the investigation concluded (1) Robbins did not unfairly administer the 
HDTR program, (2) Robbins’s intentions in taking Leyva on the ride along were “to further [his] 
desired relationship with [Leyva] rather than work related,” (3) Robbins pulled Leyva over 
“without probable cause just to see [Leyva] and further advance [his] desired relationship,” (4) 
Leyva “had not violated any laws” when Robbins pulled her over, and (5) Robbins sent 
“unprofessional communications” to Leyva with his state-issued cell phone.71  As a result of the 
investigation, Robbins was demoted and removed as the HDTR Coordinator on November 7, 
2017.72 
Procedural History 
Leyva initiated this action against Robbins on February 7, 2018.73  Leyva’s Amended 
Complaint includes four causes of action: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment sexual harassment claim, 
 
66 Although Robbins challenges Leyva’s characterization of what the internal investigation concluded, Robbins raises 
no evidentiary objections concerning the investigation’s findings.  See dkt. 44 at 8–10.  This court therefore considers 
the internal investigation’s final report. See Dkt. 55-1 (SEALED). 
67 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 21, dkt. 40-1 at 6 ¶ 10, dkt. 44 at 7 ¶ 21. 
68 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶¶ 21–22, 10 ¶ 24; dkt. 44 at 7–8. 
69 Dkt. 43 at 17–20, dkt. 53 at 41–49. 
70 Dkt. 43 at 17 ¶ 77, 19–20 ¶¶ 85–90; dkt. 53 at 41, 45–49. 
71 Dkt. 55-1 at 1–3 (SEALED). 
72 Id. at 4–5 (SEALED), dkt. 40 at 11 ¶ 29, dkt. 44 at 10 ¶ 29, dkt. 43 at 18 ¶ 81, dkt. 43-7 (Robbins Depo.) at 24:1–
22, dkt. 53 at 42–43. 
73 Dkt. 2. 
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(2) a Fourth Amendment illegal seizure claim, (3) a Utah state common law claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and (4) a Utah state constitutional claim for violation of the equal 
protection clause.74  The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.75  Leyva moved 
for summary judgment on all of her claims against Robbins,76 and Robbins moved for summary 
judgment on those claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity.77  At oral argument, however, 
Leyva dismissed her Utah state law claims.78  Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims 
remain, and the court now takes up the parties’ Motions, beginning with Robbins’s assertion of 
qualified immunity. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under color of state law” shall be liable for 
violating another’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”79  Although § 
1983 creates “a federal cause of action for damages to vindicate alleged violations of federal law 
committed by individuals acting under ‘color of state law,’” it “creates no substantive civil rights, 
only a procedural mechanism for enforcing them.”80  Thus, “[t]he elements of a § 1983 claim are: 
(1) The plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
and (2) defendant deprived them of this right acting under color of state law.”81 
 
74 Dkt. 20 at 7–14. 
75 Dkt. 40, dkt. 43. 
76 Dkt. 40.  
77 Dkt. 43.  
78 Dkt. 67 at 42:18–19.  
79 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
80 Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
81 Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1012 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
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An “[i]ndividual defendant[] named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified 
immunity, which shields public officials from damages actions unless their conduct was 
unreasonable in light of clearly established law.”82  This defense is meant to “not only protect[] 
public employees from liability, but also protects them from the burdens of litigation.”83  In 
practice, a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is subject to a different 
standard than other motions for summary judgment.84 
“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to 
the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant’s motion.”85  Specifically, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that the [defendant] violated a statutory or constitutional right, 
and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”86  “[I]f the 
plaintiff fails to establish either prong of the two-pronged qualified immunity standard, the 
defendant prevails on the defense”87 and “the court must grant the defendant qualified immunity.”88  
But if the plaintiff satisfies both prongs, the “defendant then bear[s] the traditional burden of the 
movant for summary judgment—showing ‘that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”89  A “genuine issue” exists “if there is 
sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way,” 
 
82 Doe, 912 F.3d at 1289 (citation omitted). 
83 A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation and brackets omitted). 
84 See id. (“In light of these purposes, we review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity questions 
differently from other summary judgment decisions.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson v. 
McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2000) (“However, we review summary judgment decisions involving a 
qualified immunity defense somewhat differently than other summary judgment rulings.”) (citation, quotation marks, 
and brackets omitted). 
85 Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009). 
86 Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 
87 A.M., 830 F.3d at 1134–35 (citations omitted). 
88 Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
89 Nelson, 207 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Albright v. Rodriquez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
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and “[a]n issue of fact is material if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition 
of the claim.”90 
Under qualified immunity’s first prong, a plaintiff “must articulate the clearly established 
constitutional right and the defendant’s conduct which violated the right with specificity.”91  And 
at summary judgment, the plaintiff’s factual assertions “must find support in the record.” 92  To 
determine whether a plaintiff meets this burden, the court “construe[s] the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party.”93  This “usually means adopting . . . the 
plaintiff’s version of the facts unless that version is so utterly discredited by the record that no 
reasonable jury could” believe it.94 
Under qualified immunity’s second prong, “[a] clearly established right is one that is 
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing 
violates that right.”95  “Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.”96   
To determine if a constitutional right is clearly established, the court may “not define the 
relevant constitutional right at a high level of generality.”97  Instead, it must determine whether the 
reasonable application of controlling law can be applied and “particularized to the facts of the 
 
90 Split Rail Fence Co., Inc. v. United States, 852 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 
91 Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
92 Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1004 (citation omitted). 
93 Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
94 Kendall v. Olsen, 727 Fed. App’x 970, 973 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 183 (2018). 
95 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
97 Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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case.”98  This requires a plaintiff to show “that a particular right was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”99  And a plaintiff meets this burden by identifying (1) “an on-point 
Supreme Court” decision, (2) a “published Tenth Circuit decision,” or (3) by demonstrating that 
“the clearly established weight of authority from other courts [ ] have found the law to be as [she] 
maintains.”100 
But because “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even 
in novel factual circumstances,” plaintiffs are not required to identify a case that is directly on point 
or that shares identical facts with her case.101  Instead, a plaintiff must identify a case that involves 
“materially similar conduct” or, absent similar conduct, show that general precedents apply “with 
obvious clarity to the conduct at issue.”102  To aid in this analysis, the Tenth Circuit has “adopted 
a sliding scale to determine when law is clearly established.  ‘The more obviously egregious the 
conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, the less specificity is required from prior 
case law to clearly establish the violation.’”103  Thus, “[a]lthough the very action in question does 
not have to have previously been held unlawful, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness 
must be apparent.”104 
 
98 Id.; Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining “the clearly established law must 
be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”) (citation omitted); Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 
2018) (“The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
99 A.M., 830 F.3d at 1135. 
100 Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
101 Id. at 1135–36. 
102 Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 5 (2018). 
103 A.M., 830 F.3d at 1135–36 (citations omitted). 
104 Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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When addressing a qualified immunity defense, this court may decide “which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances 
in the particular case at hand.”105 
ANALYSIS 
 Robbins argues he is entitled to qualified immunity both on Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims.  Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Leyva, the court concludes a 
reasonable jury could find that Robbins violated Leyva’s constitutional rights.106  The court 
nonetheless grants Robbins qualified immunity on each claim because the applicable law was not 
clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violations. 
I. Qualified Immunity and Leyva’s Fourth Amendment Claim 
Robbins argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on Leyva’s Fourth Amendment claim 
because Leyva consented to the stop and Leyva’s cracked windshield provided reasonable 
suspicion for the stop.107  The undisputed facts support the conclusion that Robbins violated 
Leyva’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.  But the precedent 
concerning consent in the context of this case was not clearly established at the time of the traffic 
stop, and Robbins is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
105 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
106 Cf. McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1049 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Mr. McCoy, a reasonable jury could conclude that the post-restraint force violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
107 See dkt. 43 at 33–36. 
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a. Robbins violated Leyva’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an 
unreasonable seizure 
 
“The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”108  Under Fourth 
Amendment precedent, there are three types of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) 
investigative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and 
duration and must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and 
(3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and reasonable only 
if supported by probable cause.109 
 
The parties spend the majority of their briefs arguing about whether the traffic stop was 
consensual and thus not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement.110  
Although the undisputed facts raise serious concerns about whether Leyva consented to the traffic 
stop, 111 Robbins’s actions preclude finding that she did.  Consent is absent where “an encounter 
between an officer and a citizen [] involve[s] the use of physical force or [a] show of authority on 
 
108 United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and brackets omitted) 
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). 
109 United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
110 Dkt. 43 at 33–36, dkt. 53 at 56–60, dkt. 64 at 16–17. 
111 Before the traffic stop, Leyva informed Robbins she was on the freeway, and Robbins replied, “Where? I’ll come 
pull you over.”  Dkt. 43-2 at 105.  Leyva replied with the nearest mile marker.  Id. at 104.  Robbins then asked, “Where 
ya headed?”  Id. (errors in original).  And Leyva answered, “Bluffdale I’ll be back in 20 minutes.”  Id. (errors in 
original).  Robbins responded, “I’ll be waiting 285.  You in the what car.  White car[.]” Id.  Leyva did not respond.  Id.  
Based on this conversation, Leyva arguably gave implied consent to the traffic stop before it took place because a 
reasonable person in Leyva’s position would have felt free to decline to answer Robbins’s questions.  See United States 
v. Latorre, 893 F.3d 744, 756 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We apply a two-part test for voluntary consent: (1) the law enforcement 
officers must receive either express or implied consent, and (2) that consent must be freely and voluntarily given.”) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Fox, 600 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining 
the critical inquiry in a consent analysis is “whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable 
person that she was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business.”) (citation, quotation marks, 
and brackets omitted).  But as addressed infra at 21–23, it is not clear how, or if, this consent analysis interacts with 
the law governing the constitutionality of a traffic stop. 
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the part of the officer such that a reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officer’s 
request or terminate the encounter.”112 
Here, Leyva did not recognize Robbins when he used his UHP vehicle’s emergency lights 
to stop her.113  No reasonable citizen would feel free to disregard a UHP vehicle with its emergency 
lights activated.114  Moreover, Utah law requires motorists to pull over when a law enforcement 
officer gives a visual signal, like emergency lights.115  Additionally, there is serious doubt that a 
citizen can consent to a traffic stop because “[t]raffic stops are seizures subject to the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement for reasonableness.”116  Thus, the traffic stop was not a consensual 
police-citizen encounter, and Leyva did not consent—and likely could not have consented—to the 
traffic stop. 
Because Robbins’s argument that Leyva consented to the traffic stop fails, the court now 
turns to whether the traffic stop was nevertheless reasonable and thus constitutional.  A traffic stop 
is reasonable if (1) “the officer’s action was justified at its inception” and (2) the officer’s actions 
during the stop are “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”117  The court need go no further than the first inquiry to conclude 
 
112 Lopez, 443 F.3d at 1283 (citation omitted). 
113 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 17, dkt. 44 at 5–6. 
114 See United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793, 796–97 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that activated police lights weighs 
against a consensual encounter because a reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard emergency lights 
when, “[u]nder Kansas law, motorists must stop whenever a police officer flashes his or her emergency lights.”) 
(citation omitted); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (noting that police cars with flashing 
emergency lights constitute a show of authority). 
115 See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210(1) (requiring motorists to pull over when they “receive[] a visual or audible signal 
from a law enforcement officer to bring the vehicle to a stop”). 
116 United States v. Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 882–83 (10th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
2020 WL 981935 (2020). 
117 United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
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Robbins violated Leyva’s right to be free from an unreasonable seizure because the traffic stop 
lacked justification at its inception. 
“A traffic stop is reasonable at its inception if the detaining officer, at the very least, 
reasonably suspects the driver has violated the law.”118  “[T]he level of suspicion required to 
support a traffic stop is ‘considerably less’ than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 
evidence’” and requires “only a minimal level of objective justification.”119  In assessing the 
reasonableness of the stop, the officer’s “subjective intent or good faith” are irrelevant.120 
The undisputed facts confirm Robbins lacked reasonable suspicion that Leyva had violated 
the law when he initiated the traffic stop.  Although Robbins asserts he noticed the cracks on 
Leyva’s windshield when he “began to pull [her] over,” he admits his “reason for pulling her over 
was a joke between friends” and not “to investigate a cracked windshield.”121  The UHP’s internal 
investigation also concluded Leyva “had not violated any laws” and that Robbins pulled her over 
“without probable cause just to see her and further advance [his] desired relationship.”122  Colonel 
Mike Rapich, a UHP employee who investigated the traffic stop, testified that Robbins failed to 
articulate a legal basis for the stop.123  Further, it is undisputed that Robbins did not articulate a 
legal reason for the stop, he did not require Leyva to provide her license and registration, and he 
 
118 United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1047 (10th Cir. 2006). 
119 Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d at 1137 (citations omitted). 
120 Id. (citation omitted). 
121 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 6–7. 
122 Dkt. 55-1 at 1, 3 (SEALED). 
123 Dkt. 43-12 (Colonel Rapich Depo.) at 33–34. 
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told her that he just wanted to see her.124  Finally, Robbins issued no citations or warnings to Leyva 
for her broken windshield or anything else.125 
Accordingly, the court concludes Robbins violated Leyva’s Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable seizures when he stopped her on April 2, 2017. 
b. The law concerning nonconsensual police-citizen encounters was not 
clearly established 
 
Despite Robbins’s unconstitutional conduct in pulling over Leyva, the court concludes the 
law was not clearly established concerning this particular fact scenario.  If Robbins is entitled to 
qualified immunity under this prong, two questions must be answered in the affirmative: (1) was 
the law clearly established that the traffic stop itself violated the Fourth Amendment, and (2) was 
the law clearly established that the traffic stop did not constitute a consensual police-citizen 
encounter?  Although the court answers the first question in the affirmative, it cannot do so with 
the second question.  Robbins is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Leyva’s Fourth 
Amendment claim. 
Before addressing each question, certain principles under this prong of qualified immunity 
warrant repeating.  First, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of citing to [the court] what [s]he thinks 
constitutes clearly established law.”126  Second, the plaintiff may meet this burden by citing to 
precedent that “involves materially similar conduct or applies with obvious clarity to the conduct 
at issue.”127  Third, a plaintiff’s citation to cases that merely apply “hornbook Fourth Amendment 
 
124 Dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54–55; dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 6–7; dkt. 55-1 at 1, 3–4 (SEALED). 
125 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 6 ¶ 30. 
126 Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
127 Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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principles to an unrelated factual context” generally fails to satisfy the burden.128  And fourth, 
“[w]hile there does not have to be a case that is factually identical, it must still be apparent to a 
reasonable officer in light of pre-existing law that his conduct was unlawful.”129 
Turning to the first question of whether the traffic stop itself violated clearly established 
law, Leyva cites cases applying general Fourth Amendment principles in factual scenarios that are 
not analogous to this case.130  Although she does not explain how any of the cases she cites can be 
particularized to this case, the law governing traffic stops was nevertheless clearly established 
when Robbins pulled over Leyva.  At that time, it  was clear that a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurs when an officer initiates an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion or 
unreasonably extends the scope of the detention beyond its initial justification.131  These rules 
apply “with obvious clarity” 132 to the traffic stop at issue here, where Robbins seized Leyva 
without reasonable suspicion and extended the stop for the purpose of a “goofy, funny, joke 
between friends.”133  Thus, the court agrees with Leyva that “[i]t is clear from the facts of this case 
that without the ‘consent’ alleged by Robbins, there was admittedly no reasonable suspicion.”134  
But the question of how consent plays into this analysis, if at all, is far from clear. 
Turning now to that question of whether the law clearly established that the traffic stop did 
not constitute a consensual police-citizen encounter, the court concludes Leyva has not met her 
burden.  Significantly, Leyva has not cited precedent involving a nonconsensual police-citizen 
 
128 See Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1009–11 (reversing a district court’s denial of qualified immunity for conducting the analysis 
of qualified immunity’s second prong at “too high a level of generality”). 
129 Thomas, 607 F.3d at 669 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
130 Dkt. 53 at 85–86 (incorporating generally “all of the cases cited in Point I[I]” of her memorandum). 
131 See United States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 997 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  
132 Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
133 Dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 6 ¶ 30. 
134 Dkt. 53 at 60. 
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encounter that is “materially similar” to the facts of this case or that applies with “obvious 
clarity.”135  Instead, she cursorily cites twelve different cases for general principles concerning the 
constitutionality of traffic stops and the standards governing consent.136  After reviewing these 
cases, it is clear Leyva has not cited any cases “within the relevant temporal period that even 
slightly resemble these facts” and “that would have provided fair warning to” a reasonable police 
officer that a citizen could not consent to the traffic stop in these circumstances.137  In other words, 
Leyva has failed to show how the cases she cites can be particularized to the facts in this case.  
Accordingly, Leyva has “not carried [her] burden of identifying cases that constitute clearly 
established law on these facts,” and Robbins is entitled to qualified immunity.138 
Further, it is not clear that controlling precedent can be reasonably applied and 
“particularized to the facts of th[is] case.”139  Under that precedent, “[t]he critical inquiry is 
whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that she was not at 
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business.”140  And to answer that question, 
the Tenth Circuit looks to “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,” including several, 
non-exclusive factors: 
(1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the brandishing of a weapon by 
an officer; (3) physical touching by an officer; (4) aggressive language or tone of 
voice by an officer indicating compliance is compulsory; (5) prolonged retention 
 
135 Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076 (citation omitted). 
136 Dkt. 53 at 85–86 (incorporating generally “all of the cases cited in Point I[I]” of her memorandum); see also id. at 
56–67.  The cases Leyva “incorporates” are Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 
567 (1988), Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), United States v. Bustillos-
Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2000), United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000), United States v. Patten, 
183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999), United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1998), United States v. Hernandez, 93 
F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1996), United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995), United States v. Angulo-
Fernandez, 53 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1995), and State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, 321 P.3d 1039. 
137 Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1014–15. 
138 Id. at 1015. 
139 Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
140 Fox, 600 F.3d at 1258 (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
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of a person’s personal effects; (6) a request to accompany the officer to the police 
station; (7) interaction in a small, enclosed, or non-public place; and (8) absence of 
other members of the public.141 
 
But application of those factors does not address the issue of whether a reasonable officer in 
Robbins’s shoes would have known that Leyva’s implied consent in the text messages would not 
have transformed the traffic stop into a consensual encounter. 
This conclusion is supported by how unique the facts of this case are from binding 
precedent.  Prior to the traffic stop, the Tenth Circuit had decided three cases that held the cases’ 
respective police-citizen encounters were nonconsensual.142  None of those cases involve the facts 
present in this case, which include a pre-existing and ongoing relationship between the officer and 
the citizen, an exchange of text messages concerning the stop both before and after the stop, a time 
gap between the exchange of messages and the stop, and a different location for the stop than 
initially identified by the citizen.  In short, precedent does not address nor apply to the “unique 
concerns” raised by this case, among which is the question: can a citizen ever consent to a traffic 
stop?143  Indeed, this court is unaware of any case that would have put Robbins on notice that he 
could not pull over Leyva even if it appeared that she had consented to the traffic stop. 
In sum, Robbins is entitled to qualified immunity on Leyva’s Fourth Amendment claim 
because Leyva has failed to meet her burden under qualified immunity’s second prong and the law 
was not clearly established at the time of the traffic stop such that a reasonable officer in Robbins’s 
shoes would have known the traffic stop did not constitute a consensual police-citizen encounter. 
 
 
141 Id. (citation omitted). 
142 Hatheway v. Thies, 335 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2006); and 
United States v. Fox, 600 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2010). 
143 Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1015. 
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II. Qualified Immunity and Leyva’s Fourteenth Amendment Sexual 
Harassment Claim 
 
Robbins argues he is also entitled to qualified immunity on Leyva’s Fourteenth 
Amendment sexual harassment claim and should therefore be granted summary judgment on that 
issue.  Specifically, Robbins argues he lacked state-derived authority over Leyva, he did not 
sexually harass her because she welcomed his advances, and his actions were not motivated by her 
sex.144  Proving sexual harassment typically involves a fact-intensive inquiry reserved for the jury,  
but in light of Robbins’s qualified immunity defense, the court must view the undisputed facts in 
a light most favorable to Leyva.  Doing so, the court concludes a reasonable jury could find that 
Robbins sexually harassed Leyva.145  Robbins is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity 
because existing law did not clearly establish that his conduct constituted sexual harassment. 
a. Framework for a Fourteenth Amendment Sexual Harassment Claim 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall 
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”146  Sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.147  In other 
words, the Fourteenth Amendment secures the right to be free from sexual harassment by a state 
 
144 Dkt. 43 at 23–33.  
145 Although the material facts are not in dispute, the parties contest the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
those facts.  Accordingly, a reasonable jury viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Robbins (i.e., finding in favor 
of his inferences) could also conclude he did not sexually harass Leyva. 
146 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
147 Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (“We hold that sexual harassment of the sort alleged by 
plaintiff can violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.”).  Unlike other Equal Protection 
claims, a sexual harassment claim does not require a plaintiff to show the defendant treated the plaintiff different than 
similarly situated individuals or discriminated against the plaintiff because of her sex.  See id.; see also Eisenhour v. 
Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1234 (10th Cir. 2014) (“concluding that . . . Ms. Eisenhour had no requirement to show 
she was treated differently from a similarly situated individual.”; Sh.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Tucumcari Mun. Sch., 321 F.3d 
1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2003) (“this standard is met by actions that amount to an abuse of governmental authority for 
the purpose of one’s own sexual gratification.”) (citation omitted).  Any attempt by Robbins to argue otherwise is a 
misapplication and misunderstanding of the law.  See Dkt. 43 at 29–33. 
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employee.148  This right extends to nonemployees149 and is violated when a state actor abuses his 
governmental authority “for the purpose of [his] own sexual gratification.”150  In sum, to succeed 
on a § 1983 claim for sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must 
establish that: (1) the defendant had state authority over the plaintiff and (2) the defendant abused 
that authority for his own sexual gratification.151 
1) Robbins acted under the color of state law 
Private conduct is not actionable under § 1983.152  Instead, only defendants “who represent 
the state in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it,” may 
be liable under § 1983.153  To represent the state, a defendant must have acted “under color of state 
law.”154  The “under color of state law” requirement is jurisdictional and requires a defendant to 
“have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”155  And “[t]he authority with which the 
defendant is allegedly ‘clothed’ may be either actual or apparent.”156 
In a sexual harassment case, a defendant generally acts under “color of state law” when his 
actions are “based on some authority that [he] has over the victim.”157  “Otherwise, it is difficult 
 
148 Sh.A., 321 F.3d at 1288–89. 
149 Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
150 Sh.A., 321 F.3d at 1289 (citation omitted). 
151 See id. (noting this “standard is met by actions that amount to an abuse of governmental authority for the purpose 
of one’s own sexual gratification.”) (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1218 (“to abuse any one of a 
number of kinds of authority for purpose of one’s own sexual gratification . . . would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). 
152 See Jojola, 55 F.3d at 492. 
153 Id. (citation and brackets omitted). 
154 See id. 
155 Id. at 492– 93 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
156 Id. at 493 (citations omitted). 
157 David v. City and Cty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1354 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
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to establish that the abusive action was perpetrated ‘under color of state law’ rather than as an 
essentially private act of sexual harassment.”158  Accordingly, “it is the plaintiff’s burden to . . . 
establish[] the existence of ‘a real nexus’ between the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s 
‘badge’ of state authority in order to demonstrate action was taken ‘under color of state law.’”159  
Generally, a plaintiff can meet this burden by showing the defendant’s actions occurred while he 
acted “in his official capacity[,] while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law,” or that 
he “abuse[d] the position given to him by the state.”160  Further, it is clear “police officers exercise 
governmental authority in stopping motorists.”161 
Here, as a police officer, Robbins clearly acted “under the color of state law” when he 
pulled over Leyva.  Robbins had the authority to pull over motorists, like Leyva, only because he 
was a police officer, and he used that authority when he turned on his UHP vehicle’s emergency 
lights to stop Leyva.  And, as discussed above, Utah law required Leyva to pull over once Robbins 
activated his vehicle’s emergency lights. 
Concerning the rest of Robbins and Leyva’s interactions, it is apparent their interactions 
included official business with Robbins acting in his capacity as the HDTR Coordinator.  It is also 
apparent, however, that Robbins and Leyva’s interactions included private matters unrelated to 
Robbins’s position as the HDTR Coordinator.  But the parties’ business and private interactions 
 
158 Id. (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993)). 
159 Jojola, 55 F.3d at 494; see also id. at 493 (“As we have stated, before conduct may be fairly attributed to the state 
because it constitutes action ‘under color of state law,’ there must be a ‘real nexus’ between the employee’s use or 
misuse of their authority as a public employee, and the violation allegedly committed by the defendant.”) (citations 
omitted). 
160 Whitney v. State of New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 
161 Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1218. 
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are so intertwined it is impossible to separate them in a meaningful way.162  Thus, Leyva has met 
her burden by demonstrating that Robbins exercised, at the very least, some apparent degree of 
state-derived authority over her throughout their relationship.163 
For example, Robbins admits that “at all times relevant herein,  [he] was a UHP trooper 
who was acting within the course and scope of his employment, and under color of law.”164  He 
also admits that Leyva, as WCT’s liaison to the UHP, was required to work with him as the HDTR 
Coordinator to carry out the Towing Rotation Agreement.165  Under that Agreement, Robbins had 
the power to suspend WCT from the HDTR for practices he determined were “unlawful, 
unreasonable, or otherwise not in the best interest of the public.”166  Among other violations 
warranting suspension, Robbins could suspend WCT for failure to respond to a rotation call.167  
And Robbins could “determine the length of any suspension.”168 
Robbins had this authority only because of his position as the HDTR Coordinator.  With 
this authority, Robbins could prevent Leyva from reaching the target set by her employer169 by 
suspending WCT.  Further, because of Robbins’s position, he could respond to Leyva’s concerns 
 
162 For example, on May 31, 2017, Robbins relied on his authority to get Leyva’s attention and to then direct an 
arguably flirtatious text at Leyva.  There, he texted Leyva, “Did ya hear that?”  Dkt. 43-2 at 112 (errors in original).  
Leyva responded, “Nope I stepped away from my phone. Whatcha got?”  Id. (errors in original).  Robbins answered, 
“I said, Salt lake could you get a hold of west coast towing and tell their Secretary she’s pretty darn sexy and doesn’t 
need to lose any weight….. (winking emoji)[.]”  Id. (errors in original). 
163 See David, 101 F.3d at 1353–54; see also Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Dr. Kapoor 
was able to harass Plaintiffs because of his state authority as the Medical Director of a public radiation oncology 
department and because he supervised their work.”) (citation omitted). 
164 Dkt. 20 at 3 ¶ 8, dkt. 36 at 3 ¶ 8, dkt. 40 at 6 ¶ 2, dkt. 44 at 2; See generally Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1175 (indicating 
that a relevant consideration under the “color of law” requirement is whether the victims came into contact with the 
defendant because of his position with the state). 
165 Dkt. 20 at 3 ¶ 10, dkt. 36 at 3–4, dkt. 40 at 6–7, dkt. 44 at 2–3.  Robbins advances no arguments attempting to 
distinguish the power he had over WCT from the power he had over Leyva.  See dkt. 43, dkt. 44, and dkt. 53. 
166 Dkt. 40-1 at 37–38. 
167 Id. at 32. 
168 Id. at 38. 
169 See dkt. 43 at 4 ¶¶ 3–4, dkt. 53 at 6. 
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about the HDTR and use these contacts as opportunities to attempt to further his desired 
relationship with her.170  Indeed, but for Robbins’s position as the HDTR Coordinator, Leyva 
would not have had to contact him regarding the HDTR.171 
In sum, Leyva has met her burden of showing a real nexus between Robbins’ conduct and 
his state-derived authority as a police officer and the HDTR Coordinator. 
2) A reasonable jury could conclude Robbins abused his authority for 
his own sexual gratification 
 
Although it is “clearly established” that a government actor violates the Equal Protection 
Clause when he abuses his authority for his own sexual gratification,172 the Tenth Circuit has 
 
170 See, e.g., dkt. 43-2 at 112–13. 
171 See Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1175 (“Patrick could not have harassed Whitney absent his authority as an agent for the 
State.”). 
172 See Sh.A., 321 F.3d at 1289.  This court recognizes that this standard was first described in these terms in Johnson 
v. Martin, 195 F.3d at 1218, but a review of Tenth Circuit case law on this issue demonstrates that the terms used in 
Johnson merely clarified, instead of altered, the standard first recognized in Starrett.  Accordingly, this court is not 
limited to post-Johnson cases in its analysis. 
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addressed the conduct173 that satisfies that standard on only five, clear174 occasions: first in Starrett 
v. Wadley, 175 second in Lankford v. City of Hobart,176 third in Noland v. McAdoo,177 fourth in 
Whitney v. State of New Mexico,178 and lastly in Eisenhour v. Weber Cty.179  Accordingly, this court 
 
173 The other published cases in which the Tenth Circuit has addressed § 1983 sexual harassment claims involved 
legally distinct issues.  See Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 758–60 (10th Cir. 2014) (addressing 
supervisor and municipal liability); Rost Ex Rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School, 511 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 
(10th Cir. 2008) (addressing a school district’s liability); Escue v. Northern OK College, 450 F.3d 1146, 1157– 58 
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding a jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence under the unchallenged jury 
instructions); Sh.A., 321 F.3d at 1289 (affirming a trial court’s denial of qualified immunity under the “clearly 
established” prong of qualified immunity); Maestas, 251 F.3d at 1007–13 (addressing the special circumstances that 
justify a trial court sending issues under qualified immunity’s second prong to a jury); Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1215–18 
(affirming a trial court’s denial of qualified immunity under the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity); 
Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1249–52 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing supervisor and 
school district liability); David, 101 F.3d at 1351–54 (deciding whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the 
“under the color of state law” requirement); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 73 F.3d 283, 286–88 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(addressing municipal liability); Jojola, 55 F.3d at 492– 95 (deciding whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 
the “under color of state law” requirement); Sauers v. Salt Lake Cty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 1993) (addressing 
municipal liability and evidentiary issues); Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1400–01 (holding the law was not “clearly 
established” to hold the defendants who actually harassed plaintiffs liable); D.T. by M.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 
16 of Pawnee Cty., Okl., 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990) (addressing color of state law and municipal liability issues). 
174 There are other published cases where the Tenth Circuit appears to have addressed the conduct necessary to 
constitute sexual harassment under § 1983.  See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312–13 (10th Cir. 1998); Nieto, 
268 F.3d at 1217–20.  It is unclear, however, whether these cases are applying the sexual harassment standard identified 
in Starrett.  See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1312 n. 15 (“Claims of sexual harassment and assault of inmates by prison guards 
are more properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment.”); Nieto, 268 F.3d at 1217–20 (addressing the plaintiff’s 
“hostile environment” claim under Title VII sexual harassment principles with passing reference to Starrett).  
Accordingly, this court’s analysis focuses on the five cases that unambiguously address the conduct necessary to satisfy 
the Starrett standard. 
175 See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814–15 (holding the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the 
defendant’s conduct violated plaintiff’s right to be free from sexual harassment). 
176 See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480–81 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a viable § 1983 sexual 
harassment claim does not require the termination of the victim). 
177 See Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271–72 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the defendant because the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to create “a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether [the defendant] subjected her to sexual harassment.”). 
178 See Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173–75 (holding the plaintiff had made sufficient factual allegations against the defendant 
to state a §1983 sexual harassment claim). 
179 See Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1234–36 (reversing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant because 
the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact on her § 1983 sexual harassment claim.).  After Eisenhour was 
remanded, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her sexual harassment claim.  Eisenhour v. Cty., 897 
F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018).  The defendant appealed the jury’s verdict, arguing it was not supported by sufficient 
evidence.  Id. at 1275–76.  But the Tenth Circuit disagreed and held that the evidence was sufficient.  Id.  Because the 
conduct is the same in both cases, this court only addresses the first Eisenhour case that was decided at the summary 
judgment stage of the proceedings. 
Case 2:18-cv-00121-RJS   Document 72   Filed 04/06/20   Page 29 of 39
30 
 
turns to those cases for guidance on whether a reasonable jury could conclude Robbins sexually 
harassed Leyva. 
First, in Starrett v. Wadley, the Tenth Circuit upheld a jury verdict by determining that the 
“sexual harassment of the sort alleged by plaintiff can violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
equal protection of the laws.”180  There, the plaintiff’s supervisor “had made various sexual 
advances towards [the plaintiff],” repeatedly asked the plaintiff “to meet him during business hours 
at his house or at other secluded locations,” once asked the plaintiff “to go with him to a motel,” 
“pinched plaintiff’s buttocks with his full hand,” “put his arm on plaintiff’s leg and invited her to 
his hotel room,” and “often made obscene gestures to plaintiff during work hours.”181  Further, the 
defendant “sexually harassed other female employees in the office” and changed the way he treated 
the plaintiff when “she spurned his advances and complained about his harassment.”182  Ultimately, 
after treating the plaintiff with hostility and threatening that she would be terminated, the defendant 
“made good on his threats and fired plaintiff.”183 
Second, in Lankford v. City of Hobart, the Tenth Circuit reinstated the plaintiff’s § 1983 
sexual harassment claim because there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
the defendant’s conduct constituted sexual harassment.184  In so doing, the Circuit determined the 
defendant’s conduct could satisfy the standard set out in Starrett, which “indicates that the 
fondling, unwelcome advances, and obscene remarks are sufficient alone to constitute sexual 
harassment.”185  Specifically, the Lankford defendant’s “alleged sexual harassment included 
 
180 Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814–15. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 815. 
183 Id. 
184 Lankford, 27 F.3d at 480–81. 
185 Id. at 481. 
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fondling, requesting sexual favors, and making obscene gestures and unwelcome advances” 
towards the plaintiffs.186  When the defendant realized “his sexual advances would not be 
accepted,” he spied on the plaintiffs and spread rumors about one of the plaintiffs.187  Ultimately, 
he “allegedly used his authority as chief of police to obtain [a plaintiff’s] private medical records 
without her consent . . . to discredit her or to prove” the rumors he started about her sexuality.188 
Third, in Noland v. McAdoo, the Tenth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence, when 
“viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,” to create “a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether [the defendant] subjected [the plaintiff] to sexual harassment.”189  There, the 
evidence showed the defendant “had made numerous unwelcomed advances toward [the 
plaintiff],” “would stand very close to her . . . making it impossible for her to pass . . . without 
rubbing up against him,” and “put his hand on her waist or shoulder, despite her telling him that 
she did not appreciate this contact.”190  Further, the defendant “would continually ask [the plaintiff] 
to go to lunch with him . . . or to go on a date with him,” “purchased a home two blocks from 
plaintiff’s home ‘to be closer to’ her,” “would buy her gifts . . . and send her flowers,” and “told 
plaintiff that he loved her and that when he was with other women he would think about her a 
lot.”191  The plaintiff complained to the defendant’s superior about the defendant’s conduct “on 
several occasions.”192  And once the defendant became the plaintiff’s supervisor, he asked her to 
“meet him . . . in the evening . . . to have dinner with him and to ‘see if we can’t get along a little 
 
186 Id. at 478. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Noland, 39 F.3d at 272. 
190 Id. at 272. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
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more than we have lately.’”193  After the plaintiff declined the defendant’s invitation, he “would 
not speak to plaintiff” and, “[w]ithin the few weeks,” terminated her.194 
Fourth, in Whitney v. State of New Mexico, the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s 
“allegations of sexual harassment by [the defendant] [were] sufficient to state a claim for relief 
under § 1983.”195  There, the plaintiff alleged the defendant “harassed her at a time that [he] had 
some state-derived authority over her ability to get a license” and “could not have harassed [her] 
absent his authority as an agent for the State.”196  Specifically, the plaintiff attempted to get a day 
care license from the defendant but he “harassed her and denied her a license . . . because [the 
plaintiff] [was] female.”197  After the plaintiff obtained employment with a day care facility, the 
defendant “continued to harass her” and made “false remarks” that “insinuat[ed] that [the plaintiff] 
and [her boss] were intimately involved.”198 
And fifth, in Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., the Tenth Circuit again reinstated a plaintiff’s § 1983 
sexual harassment claim at the summary judgment stage, holding that the plaintiff had overcome 
the defendant’s qualified immunity defense by “present[ing] evidence that would [ ] allow a 
reasonable jury to infer that she had been discriminated against because of her sex.”199  There, the 
plaintiff alleged the defendant, a state judge and her boss, subjected her “to offensive touching and 
unreasonable questions about her activities away from work.”200  Specifically, she alleged the 
 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1175. 
196 Id. at 1174–75. 
197 Id. at 1172. 
198 Id. 
199 Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1234–36. 
200 Id. at 1224. 
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defendant “became ‘touchy’ and would often stand so close to her that his groin rubbed against 
her,” “once called [her] into his office and told her that he had a dream about her in which she was 
naked,” and had written a romantic poem about the plaintiff.201  Coupled with this behavior, the 
defendant began requiring the plaintiff to get his approval before missing work, which included 
her telling him “where she was going, what she was doing, and whom she would be with.”202  And 
even though the plaintiff reported the defendant’s sexual harassment, the Circuit noted that “[o]ur 
cases do not suggest that a plaintiff’s failure to report harassment precludes liability for an equal-
protection violation.”203 
These cases demonstrate that a defendant abuses authority when he utilizes his state-
derived authority as part of or to perpetuate the harassment.204  Evidence of a defendant relying in 
any way on his state-derived authority to attempt to influence or coerce a plaintiff to succumb to 
sexual advances satisfies this requirement.205  Thus, threats or promises backed by state authority 
would be clear abuses.206  Likewise, actual adverse action punishing a plaintiff’s rebuffs or actual 
benefits given for a plaintiff’s coerced consent constitutes clear abuses.207 
Additionally, these cases show that a defendant abuses his authority for his own sexual 
gratification when he engages in persistent, sexual advances towards the plaintiff.208  Sexual 
 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 1235 (citations omitted). 
204 See id. at 1175 (“Patrick could not have harassed Whitney absent his authority as an agent of the State.”) (citation 
omitted). 
205 See id. at 1174 (“[T]he jury reasonably could have concluded that [Xiong] used his government position to exert 
influence and physical control over these plaintiffs in order to sexually assault them.”) (quoting Dang Vang v. Vang 
Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
206 See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 815 (“Wadley ultimately made good on his threats and fired plaintiff.”). 
207 See id. 
208 See id. at 812; see also Noland, 39 F.3d at 272. 
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advances may include egregious conduct like obscene gestures, obscene comments, or sexual 
touching.209  They may also include repeated and persistent requests for dates, expressions of 
romantic feelings, or giving of gifts.210  And although there is a stronger showing of sexual 
harassment when a defendant continues his sexual advances despite the plaintiff having made it 
clear the conduct is unwelcome or unwanted, this is not a requirement.211 
Considering these principles, this case presents a very close call.  But a reasonable jury 
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Leyva could conclude that Robbins abused his 
authority for his own sexual gratification.  Early in the parties’ interactions, Robbins used his 
position as a police officer to pull over Leyva just to see her.212  Further, Robbins utilized his 
position as the HDTR Coordinator—and his work phone—throughout the parties’ interactions to 
maintain contact with Leyva, direct sexual comments at her, ask her for her “sexiest picture,” invite 
her out to drinks, invite himself over to her house, and call her names like “my lady” and “babe.”  
He also deleted his text messages with Leyva so his wife would not find them.213  When the parties’ 
spoke on the phone in June 2017, a reasonable jury could find that Robbins threatened Leyva with 
adverse action in the HDTR when he told her not to give him a reason not to like her.214 
 
209 See Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812; see also Lankford, 27 F.3d at 481 (“fondling, unwelcome advances, and obscene 
remarks are sufficient alone to constitute sexual harassment.”) (citation omitted). 
210 See Starrett, 876 F.3d at 812; see also Noland, 39 F.3d at 272; Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1224. 
211 See generally Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1174–75 (explaining that Whitney’s allegations, which did not include any 
assertion that she had informed the defendant or his supervisors that his actions were unwanted, were sufficient to 
state a § 1983 sexual harassment claim); see also Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1235 (“Our cases do not suggest that a 
plaintiff’s failure to report harassment precludes liability for an equal-protection violation.”) (citations omitted). 
212 Dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 54:20–21 (“I don’t need to see that, just seeing you is enough.”). 
213 Dkt. 43-7 (Robbins Depo.) at 25:5–17. 
214 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 20 (“Now, do not give me a reason not to like you.”). 
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Additionally, even though some of Leyva’s text messages can be reasonably interpreted as 
flirtatious, she “strictly disclaims any intentionally flirtatious behavior toward Robbins”215 and 
asserts that she “politely attempted to deflect Robbins’ unwanted suggestive text messages, but she 
also had to avoid upsetting Robbins since he controlled [WCT’s] access to lucrative heavy duty 
towing jobs.”216  Thus, according to Leyva, some of her text messages “reflected an attempt to 
humor Robbins so as not [to] make him angry.”217  A reasonably jury could interpret the record 
consistent with Leyva’s view. 
For example, Robbins repeatedly professed his sexual attraction to Leyva, but the record 
does not show that she returned the favor. 218  He also invited himself to Leyva’s home four times, 
but she never appears to have accepted those invitations.219  Further, he asked her to send him her 
“sexiest picture,” and she denied the request.220  He regularly commented on Leyva’s physical 
appearance and called her names like “sweet pea,” “skinny lady,” “my lady,” “hot blond chick,” 
and “babe,” but Leyva did not reciprocate. 221  When the parties got together for meals, it was to 
address business.222  And in early May 2017, Leyva told her boss that Robbins was sexually 
harassing her,223 and the UHP was contacted.224  The UHP’s internal investigation also drew three 
relevant conclusions: (1) when Robbins took Leyva on the ride-along, his “intentions were 
 
215 Dkt. 40 at 8 ¶ 15. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Dkt. 43-2 at 34, 51, 109–10, 112–13. 
219 Id. at 29, 90, 104, 145. 
220 Id. at 29–30. 
221 Id. at 18, 25, 38, 50, 69, 79, 82, 86, 111, 128. 
222 Dkt. 53 at 17, dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 111:23–112:24, dkt. 64 at 5–6. 
223 Dkt. 40 at 9 ¶ 21, dkt. 40-1 at 6 ¶ 20, dkt. 44 at 7. 
224 Dkt. 40 at 9–10, dkt. 44 at 7–8. 
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personal to further [his] desired relationship with [her] rather than work related”; (2) Robbins 
pulled Leyva over “without probable cause just to see [her] and further advance [his] desired 
relationship”; and (3) Robbins violated multiple UHP policies when he used his government-issued 
phone to send Leyva “unprofessional communications.” 225 
In sum, viewing these undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Leyva, a reasonable 
jury could conclude Robbins sexually harassed her. 
b. The law on sexual harassment claims was not clearly established 
Robbins argues the law on sexual harassment claims was not clearly established.226  In 
particular, Robbins argues Leyva cannot cite a case that clearly governs his conduct.227  The court 
agrees.  Leyva has not identified binding precedent that involves “materially similar conduct” or 
that “applies with obvious clarity”228 in a manner that would have made it “apparent to a reasonable 
officer” that Robbins’s conduct violated Leyva’s constitutional right to be free from sexual 
harassment.229  Accordingly, Leyva has not met her burden,230 and Robbins is entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
Leyva attempts to meet her burden by citing to Johnson and arguing that it clearly 
established Robbins’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 231  But Johnson did not 
address the conduct that constitutes sexual harassment.232  Rather, Johnson clearly established that 
 
225 Dkt. 55-1 at 1–3 (SEALED). 
226 Dkt. 43 at 37–39. 
227 Id. at 38. 
228 Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
229 Thomas, 607 F.3d at 669 (citations omitted). 
230 See id. 
231 Dkt. 53 at 86–87. 
232 See Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1215–18. 
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anyone who abuses his state-derived authority for the purpose of his own sexual gratification 
violates the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the setting where that abuse occurs, e.g., an 
employer-employee setting,233 teacher-student setting,234 or a state actor-private citizen setting.235  
Thus, Leyva’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced. 
But even assuming the Tenth Circuit had addressed and held that the Johnson defendant’s 
conduct constituted sexual harassment, the facts of that case are not “particularized to the facts of 
th[is] case.”236  In Johnson, the defendant who sexually harassed the plaintiffs held a state job with 
the “authority to certify that various construction projects complied with municipal building 
codes.”237  In claiming the defendant sexually harassed them, “the plaintiffs’ allegations differ[ed] 
in many details, [but] most involve[d] attempts by [the defendant] to obtain sexual favors in 
exchange for favorable consideration of permit applications and favorable determinations of 
compliance with city codes.”238  Those allegations included the defendant making sexual 
comments, engaging in unwelcome sexual touching, looking under one plaintiff’s nightgown, 
soliciting plaintiffs for sex in exchange for favorable treatment, attempting “forcible sex,” threats 
to find a plaintiff’s business in violation coupled with sexual remarks, offering money in exchange 
 
233 See id. at 1217. 
234 See Sh.A., 321 F.3d at 1289 (“In light of Johnson and Franklin, we conclude that a reasonable teacher would have 
known in the spring of 1997 that sexual harassment which gives rise to a violation of equal protection in the 
employment context will also do so in the teacher-on-student context.”). 
235 See Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1218. 
236 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, even if Leyva had 
attempted to analogize the facts here to the facts in Starrett, Lankford, Noland, Whitney, or Eisenhour, Robbins’s 
conduct in the context of this case is easily distinguished from the obviously violative conduct in those cases, which 
is outlined in detail supra at 29–32. 
237 Johnson, 195 F.3d at 1211. 
238 Id. 
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for sex, “hugging and touching [a plaintiff] in a sexual manner,” and making comments about one 
plaintiff’s appearance.239 
Robbins’s conduct is not “materially similar” to the Johnson defendant’s conduct, and no 
reasonable officer would understand that Johnson applies “with obvious clarity” to Robbins’s 
conduct.240  Specifically, Robbins never sexually assaulted Leyva nor attempted to obtain sexual 
favors in exchange for doing his job.  There is no evidence Robbins ever sabotaged or manipulated 
the HDTR to further his relationship with Leyva or otherwise.241  And apart from some “hugging” 
Leyva attempts to characterize as similar to the Johnson defendant’s “hugging and touching in a 
sexual manner,” there is no evidence Robbins ever sexually touched Leyva.242 
Additionally, although Robbins sent texts with sexual innuendo and concerning Leyva’s 
appearance, Leyva also used sexual innuendo during text conversations and openly discussed her 
weight with Robbins as part of their weight loss competition.243  She also texted Robbins messages 
that can reasonably be interpreted as flirtatious.244  Further, Leyva initiated many text 
conversations that were unrelated to business, invited Robbins to get together for meals, and 
attended business meals with Robbins that were organized through text messages with what can 
reasonably be viewed as sexual overtures.245  Also, the record does not indicate Robbins persisted 
in his conduct despite learning of Leyva’s complaint to her boss in May 2017 because it appears 
Robbins did not learn of Leyva’s complaint until the internal investigation began in June 2017.  
 
239 Id. at 1211–12. 
240 Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076 (citations omitted). 
241 See dkt. 43-3 (Leyva Depo.) at 85:4–8; dkt. 43-5 (Robbins Decl.) at 3–4, 8; dkt. 43-7 (Robbins Depo.) at 8–83. 
242 Dkt. 53 at 69–70. 
243 See Dkt. 43-2 at 36–37, 124–25. 
244 See id. at 30 (Well . . . how can we remedy that??”). 
245 Dkt. 43-2 at 36–37, 50, 56–57, 61, 79–80, 91, 101–02, 121, 126, 133. 
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Conversely, Leyva’s arguably flirtatious conduct appears to have continued even after she lodged 
her complaint against Robbins.  At bottom, Robbins’s conduct in the context of the parties’ 
relationship—at least as revealed by text messages—is clearly distinct from the Johnson 
defendant’s egregious misconduct and is not the type of “obviously egregious” conduct that 
justifies “less specificity from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.”246 
Accordingly, Robbins is entitled to qualified immunity on Leyva’s Fourteenth Amendment 
claim because Leyva has not carried her burden by citing to precedent that clearly establishes the 
unconstitutional nature of Robbins’s conduct.  Indeed, the court is unaware of any pre-existing 
authority that clearly establishes the violative nature of Robbins’s conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the qualified immunity standard, the court concludes a reasonable jury could find 
Robbins violated Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Nonetheless, Robbins is 
immune under the second prong of the qualified immunity defense on each claim.  For the 
foregoing reasons, Robbins’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED,247 Leyva’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment is DENIED,248 and the Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 
SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April 2020. 
 
      BY THE COURT: 
 
       
________________________________________ 
      ROBERT J. SHELBY 
United States Chief District Judge 
 
246 A.M., 830 F.3d at 1135–36 (citations omitted). 
247 Dkt. 43. 
248 Dkt. 40. 
Case 2:18-cv-00121-RJS   Document 72   Filed 04/06/20   Page 39 of 39
